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DEFINING AGGRESSION: AN OPPORTUNITY
TO CURTAIL THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
OF NON-STATE ACTORS
INTRODUCTION

I

n 1999, the United Nations (“U.N.”) passed resolution 1267, which
created the “Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee” tasked
with monitoring sanctions placed against the Taliban.1 Two years after
the sanctions were put into place, terrorists belonging to and associated
with Al-Qaida hijacked four United States airplanes in furtherance of a
terrorist attack that would forever be remembered as “9/11.” 2 Since
2001, the U.N. has passed seven additional resolutions modifying the
sanctions regime to include individuals and entities associated with
Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaida, and the Taliban.3 Yet, between September
2001 and March 2004, Al-Qaida was accredited for seven additional terrorist attacks. 4
A possible reason why U.N. sanctions have had a limited effect on AlQaida is because Al-Qaida is a non-state actor (“NSA”). The term NSA
has a variety of different meanings; spanning from rebels and terrorists to
businessman and religious groups. 5 The intuitive definition of a NSA is
quite simple: any person or group that is not a state. 6 However, this Note
is particularly interested in the category of NSAs defined as “armed

1. Sanctions were initially levied against Taliban for their support of Al-Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden. Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267
(1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/index.shtml (last visited Feb.
18, 2011) [hereinafter Security Council Committee Concerning Al-Qaida and Taliban];
S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
2. Hijacked airliners were flown into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, claiming
about 3,000 lives. An additional plane was believed to be heading towards the White
House, but crashed outside of Pittsburgh. In Depth: September 11 What Happened?,
NEWS
ONLINE
(Sept.
11,
2007),
CBC
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/sep11/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
3. Resolutions 1390(2002), 1455(2003), 1526(2004), 1617(2005), 1735(2006), and
1822(2008) were all passed so that sanctions would apply to designated individuals and
groups associated with Osama bin Laden and/or the Taliban, irrelevant of their location.
Security Council Committee Concerning Al-Qaida and Taliban, supra note 1.
4. See Mary Glendinning, Timeline: Al-Qaida Attacks on Western Targets, NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(July
7,
2005),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4733944 (last visited Jan. 15,
2011).
5. See Andrew Clapham, Non-State Actors, in POST CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING: A
LEXICON 200, 200 (Vincent Chetail ed., 2009).
6. See id.
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groups that operate beyond state control.” 7 This type of NSA includes,
but is not limited to rebels, local militants, vigilantes, warlords, and civil
defense forces. 8 Al-Qaida falls into this category of armed groups because they are an international terrorist organization that does not depend
on the support of a political state.9 Yet, Al-Qaida is just one example; the
International Institute of Strategic Studies’ armed conflict database currently lists eighty-four different NSA groups in the Middle East and
North Africa alone. 10
The problem that NSAs present to the international community is exemplified by Al-Qaeda: despite a slew of U.N. sanctions, Al-Qaida has
persisted in terrorist activity. International humanitarian and human
rights laws have been similarly ineffective with policing the criminal
activities of NSAs. 11 This is troubling because the international climate
has grown less state-centered, with increasing influence from NSAs. 12 As
the threat presented by NSAs expands, 13 it is imperative that the international community recognize the changing dynamic of conflicts, internal
and international, and adapt its laws accordingly.
One such opportunity to shape the laws of armed conflicts arose in
2010, when the Assembly of State Parties 14 (“ASP”) to the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”) met to review the Rome Statute and define the

7. Caroline Holmqvist, Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in Post-Conflict Settings,
in SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 45, 45 (Alan Bryden &
Heiner Hanggi eds., 2005) (discussing the importance of including NSAs in peace talks
once a conflict has concluded).
8. Id.
9. Laura Hayes et al., Al-Qaeda: Osama bin Laden’s Network of Terror,
INFOPLEASE.COM, http://www.infoplease.com/spot/al-qaeda-terrorism.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2011) (explaining the leadership and structure of Al-Qaida, and how Al-Qaida is
different than “more traditional terrorist organizations”).
10. See Armed Conflict Database, THE INT’L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES,
http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictList.asp (last visited Jan. 15,
2011).
11. See Marco Sassòli, Possible Legal Mechanisms to Improve Compliance by
Armed Groups with International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights
Law 2 (2003) (Armed Groups Conf., Conference Paper), available at
http://www.genevacall.org/resources/other-documents-studies/f-other-documentsstudies/2001-2010/2003-13nov-sassoli.pdf.
12. Id. at 2.
13. See id.
14. The ASP to the ICC refers to those countries that have ratified the Rome Statute,
and make up the court’s governing body. In the News: What Should You Know About
SOLUTIONS,
2010
ICC
Review
Conference?,
GLOBAL
http://www.globalsolutions.org/issues/what_should_you_know_about_2010_icc_review_
conference (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter In the News].
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“crime of aggression.” 15 Although not the formal definition, aggression
refers to the legality of resorting to force.16 This conference was significant, because how the crime is defined will determine whether NSAs,
like Al-Qaida, can be prosecuted for attacks like 9/11. As it stands, AlQaida would have escaped prosecution. The adopted definition focuses
entirely on state action, and reads in pertinent part:
[T]he planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of
the United Nations. 17

Though the amendment was passed in 2010, the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction over this crime subject to another vote to be held after
January 1, 2017. 18 Going forward with such a definition would be a mistake. As the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change
stated, “the norms governing the use of force by non-state actors have
not kept pace with those pertaining to states.” 19 With the laws of war
continually growing outdated, adding such a provision to the Rome Statute is like placing a fresh brick atop a crumbling foundation.
Part I of this Note provides a background of the international laws governing conflicts, particularly those relating to NSAs. Part II criticizes
the current international framework for conflict resolution. Specifically,
Part II discusses why international law is too outdated to properly handle
modern conflicts and how developments in international criminal law
make it the best avenue for enforcing laws against NSAs. Part III focuses
15. Review Conference of the Rome Statute, COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=review (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Review Conference of the Rome Statute].
16. Frédéric Mégret, International Criminal Law 13 (Dec. 29, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1321253&download=yes
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
17. Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art 8(2),
June 11, 2010, Depository Notification C.N.651.2010.Treaties-8 [hereinafter Rome Statute Amendments].
18. Id. art 15(2).
19. In a speech delivered before the General Assembly in September 2003, the Secretary-General of the U.N. announced that the member states needed to come to an agreement on the nature of the threats to collective security. With this goal in mind, the Secretary-General convened a panel including eminent persons to provide a comprehensive
view on this subject, as well as advice on how to move forward. The results of this panel
were presented to the General Assembly on December 2, 2004. The Secretary-General,
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, ¶ 159, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter High-Level Panel Report].
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on the Rome Statute and particularly the 2010 review. Given that this
review amended the Rome Statute to define the crime of aggression, this
Note discusses the implications and shortcomings of this amendment.
Lastly, Part IV argues that by passing a state-focused definition of aggression, the international community missed a critical opportunity to
reign in the illegal activities of NSAs.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
According to its preamble, the goal of the U.N. is to promote global
peace, “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,” establish conditions
under which justice can flourish, and “promote social progress and better
standards of life.” 20 It logically follows that the U.N. Charter charges the
Security Council with the goal of restoring and maintaining global peace
and security, 21 while not aggravating the situation. 22 So although the
U.N. is an assembly of nations, to meet their responsibilities the U.N.
must have certain tactics at its disposal for dealing with the threats presented by NSAs. In this vein, in 2006 the U.N. published a set of guidelines entitled “Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups.” 23 The
manual lists international humanitarian law, international human rights
law, and international criminal law as the three principle branches that
frame the discussion for humanitarian negotiations with NSAs.24 While
criminal and humanitarian laws are specific to conflicts, international
human rights law provides certain universal rights guaranteed to all
people. 25 The guidelines of such negotiations are of special interest to
this discussion since international humanitarian law is often used synonymously to describe the laws of war or proscribe appropriate conduct
20. U.N. Charter pmbl.
21. Id. art. 39.
22. Article 40 of the U.N. Charter states:
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may,
before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided
for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures
shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with
such provisional measures.
Id. art. 40.
23. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners (Jan. 2006) (by Gerald
McHugh & Manuel Bessler) [hereinafter Humanitarian Negotiations Manual].
24. Id. at 30.
25. Id. at 33.
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during wartime. 26 Thus, adherence to international humanitarian law is
closely related to conflict resolution.
To avoid confusion, it is worth noting the difference between the terms
“humanitarian principles” and “international humanitarian law.” In general, humanitarian principles refer to alleviating human suffering wherever it may be found. 27 This term comes from, and is the focus of the
International Committee of the Red Cross. 28 On the other hand, international humanitarian law is a set of rules which seeks to “limit the effects
of armed conflicts.” 29 To this extent, it looks to protect those that were
not involved in, or are no longer involved in armed conflicts, and restricts the methods and tactics used to carry out a war.30 This area of law
is comprised of a number of treaties, as well as custom. 31 At its core,
those treaties are the Geneva Convention of 1949, which binds nearly
every state in the world, 32 and the additional protocols of 1977. 33 Of
these treaties, the ones specific to NSAs are Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, and Protocol Additional II. 34 Additionally, customary international humanitarian law is a set of rules and norms that has
arisen out of regular practice, creating a general belief that such practice
should be adhered to as a matter of law. 35
It is important to remember that treaty-based international humanitarian law was enacted by states. Thus, in theory, NSAs are expected to
follow and adhere to a set of rules and guidelines that they had no part in
creating. 36 To complicate matters further, NSAs are typically involved in
26. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Advisory Serv. on Int’l Humanitarian Law,
What is International Humanitarian Law? (July 31, 2004), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf (defining international humanitarian law) [hereinafter ICRC, International Humanitarian Law].
27. See Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary,
ICRC (1979) (discussing the purpose of the Red Cross, a non-governmental organization
that was founded to “bring[] assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the
battlefield”).
28. Id.
29. ICRC, International Humanitarian Law, supra note 26.
30. Some agreements specify the protection of children, or forbid the use of specific
weapons and tactics. Id.
31. Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 30.
32. ICRC, International Humanitarian Law, supra note 26.
33. Other treaties of international humanitarian law include the Hague Conventions of
1907. Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 30.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 32 (pointing out that even if a state is not a signatory to a given treaty, it is
still expected to adhere to the principle of not targeting buildings that are essential to
civilian survival, such as water treatment plants).
36. See Sassòli, supra note 11, at 6.
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fighting against the state that enacted the law that is supposed to bind
them and by definition, are illegal in said state.37 It logically follows that
where the law was created with the problems and goals of only one party
in mind, these laws will be less effective. 38 Given the vast number of
NSAs around the world, and the fact that by their nature, it is impossible
to predict which NSAs will exist in the future, lack of participation by
NSAs in international treaties is unlikely to change. Furthermore, it is
improbable that there will be any future conferences regarding this area
of law, as the codification of international humanitarian laws has largely
been completed. 39
Customary international humanitarian law is considered binding on
both sides of a conflict, irrelevant of ratification, and enjoys a higher degree of legitimacy. 40 Dubbed the “Marten’s Clause,” one of the most important rules of customary international humanitarian law comes from
the preamble of Additional Protocol II. 41 It declares that “in cases not
covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.” 42 So since customary international humanitarian law exists
without formalized treaties, a nation’s or individuals’ approval of the law
is theoretically immaterial to its application.

37. Id. at 7.
38. See id. at 6 (discussing that at least psychologically, people might have an easier
time accepting a set of laws if they were involved or represented in the creation of the
laws).
39. The Hague Conventions were in 1907, the Geneva Conventions were in 1949, and
the Additional Protocols were enacted in 1977. Thus, there has not been a new treaty of
international humanitarian law in forty-two years. See generally Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 30; see also Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Binding Armed Opposition Groups Through Humanitarian Treaty Law and Customary Law, 27 COLLEGIUM
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 123, 128 (2003) [hereinafter Henckaerts, Binding Armed Opposition
Groups] (discussing how involving NSAs in future treaties is not a likely remedy to the
problem of NSAs being unrepresented in the treaties that currently govern international
humanitarian law).
40. Henckaerts, Binding Armed Opposition Groups, supra note 39, at 128; see also
Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 857
INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 175, 198–212 (2005) [hereinafter Henckaerts, Humanitarian Law] (providing a description of the 161 rules recognized as binding customary
international humanitarian law).
41. Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 32.
42. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) pmbl,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
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Much like international humanitarian law, international human rights
law is composed mostly of treaties, declarations, and covenants, which
are signed and ratified by states. 43 The goal of these treaties and covenants is to define the “universal, interdependent and indivisible entitlements of individuals.” 44 Unlike international humanitarian law, these
laws are applicable during both peace and wartime, and can never be
suspended. 45 Another difference is that international human rights laws
only impose responsibility on the state to its citizens, 46 and as such, only
the state is capable of violating human rights laws.47 An opposing view is
that although NSAs cannot be a party to the existing treaties, its members
are expected to adhere to them and will be prosecuted accordingly for
violations. 48 Thus, much like international humanitarian law, international human rights law excludes NSAs from the process, but expects them
to abide by the results.
Of the three, international criminal law provides the most effective
foundation for holding NSAs accountable for their international crimes. 49
This branch of law imposes criminal sanctions in an effort to protect a
certain international order, or basic core values that pierce state borders. 50 Although international criminal law initially took aim at states
housing international criminals, over time the focus has shifted to individual criminal responsibility. 51 Despite this focus on individual respon43. These, among others, include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 33.
44. Id.
45. Henckaerts, Humanitarian Law, supra note 40, at 196.
46. See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict
Situations, 863 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 491, 511 (2006) (presenting the arguments
for why human rights laws do not actually bind NSAs).
47. See The High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, ¶ 18,
delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/64 (Dec. 27,
2002) [hereinafter The Right to a Remedy] (discussing the right to a remedy for persons
victimized by human rights violations, and finding such remedies are only available when
the perpetrator is a state actor).
48. See Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 33 (acknowledging that
it is the state’s responsibility to enforce international human rights law, but NSAs can be
prosecuted for their violation under applicable national law, or international criminal
law).
49. “International crimes,” does not necessarily have the same connotation as “international criminal law.” As used here, it simply refers to any violation of international
law.
50. Mégret, supra note 16, at 10–11.
51. Id. at 4; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(2), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (providing in pertinent part that
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sibility, international criminal law still shares the same structure as other
fields of international law; individuals can only be prosecuted for violating a law to which their state was a member. 52 International criminal law
is derived from the general principles of international law, agreements by
states on particular activities, and commonly recognized principles of
national law. 53 Although treaty-based international criminal law is found
in several agreements, 54 this Note focuses on the Rome Statute.
The Rome Statute holds special importance because it is considered the
most comprehensive substantive piece of international criminal law and,
in effect, codifies all of the “core crimes.” 55 Furthermore, it is the instrument which created the ICC, the first permanent, international
court. 56 The ICC was created to promote the rule of law and was given
“the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern.” 57 Moreover, the Rome Statute provides
the ICC with a list of sources of law to apply. 58 This is unique to the ICC
because founding documents for other international criminal laws were
focused on national state law. 59 On the other hand, Article 21 of the
Rome Statute declares itself first among sources of law for the court to
apply. 60 This bears special importance to NSAs because the Rome Statute establishes jurisdiction over individual 61 and specifically addresses
non-international conflicts. 62 Thus, given its focus on individuals, and

“a person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually
responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute”).
52. Mégret, supra note 16, at 5.
53. Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 34.
54. Examples include: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998),
The U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), and The Protocol
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
(2000). Id.
55. Mégret, supra note 16, at 7.
56. Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 35.
57. It further provides that the court will assume a complementary role to national
criminal courts, and that the jurisdiction and functioning of the court is to be governed by
the statute. Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 1.
58. Id. art. 21.
59. See Mégret, supra note 16, at 6.
60. Only after applying the Rome Statute, “Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence,” may the ICC look to pertinent treaties and rules from international
law. Last amongst applicable law for the ICC are general principles that the court derives
from national laws of legal systems around the world, particularly the states that might
normally exercise jurisdiction. See Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 21.
61. Id. art 1.
62. Article 8(2)(c) provides in sum and substance:
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jurisdiction over NSAs, the ICC and amendments to the Rome Statute
bear a special importance to the future of conflict resolution in the context of NSAs.
Although the laws are in place, they must still be enforced. Historically, international criminal law has been uniquely vulnerable to claims criticizing it for this very failure. 63 One reason for this problem is that
strong international criminal law enforcement is typically linked to the
strength of the organization behind it. 64 In this vein, the ICC has benefited substantially from backing by a coalition of “like minded” States. 65
Although the U.S. has been critical of the ICC, it has received support
from the European Union as well as a number of Latin American and
African States. 66 Moreover, the U.N. even acknowledged that “[i]n the
area of legal mechanisms, there have been few more important recent
developments than the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal
Court.” 67 Further U.N. support for the ICC is found in the Relationship
Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, adopted in 2004. 68 The preamble of this agreement recognizes the
important role played by the ICC, and states the U.N.’s desire to establish a “mutually beneficial relationship.” 69
Another reason that international criminal law stands out amongst other branches of international law is International Military Tribunals

In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely . . .
Id. art. 8(2)(c).
Article 8(2)(f) further provides:
. . . It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when
there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized groups or between such groups.
Id. art. 8(2)(f).
63. Mégret, supra note 16, at 22.
64. For instance, one reason that the prohibition on slave traffic in the 19th century
was successful is that Britain threw its weight behind the prohibition, and threatened to
use British forces to patrol the Atlantic to enforce the ban. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶ 90.
68. Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and
the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/58/874/Annex (Aug. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Negotiated
Relationship Agreement] (highlighting the ways in which the U.N. and the ICC are already connected, while providing future goals and areas of cooperation).
69. Id. pmbl.
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(“IMTs”). An IMT is typically created by the same treaty that put into
force a given set of laws.70 Historically, these tribunals were created ad
hoc to adjudicate a specific situation and were limited either in territory,
time, or personally. 71 For example, the Nuremberg IMT was created by
the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal. 72 It was
created in the wake of World War II with the specific purpose of trying
crimes stemming from that war. 73 Although the Rome Statute’s creation
of the ICC is technically considered an IMT in the same regard as tribunals before it, it stands out as the only one established permanently and
given universal jurisdiction. 74
II. THE OUTDATED INTERNATIONAL MODEL
One of the chief issues that the international community has with policing NSAs is repercussions. Punishment is important, because as discussed in this Section, NSAs may not recognize the laws as applicable to
them. 75 To adequately appreciate the shortcomings of the global system
and the international laws governing war, the discussion should begin
with the founding of the U.N. and its Charter. The preamble immediately
evidences why the U.N. has problems dealing with NSAs: although the
purpose of the U.N. is promoting global peace, the Charter was enacted
by an assembly of governments. 76 Furthermore, the U.N. has since ad70. Mégret, supra note 16, at 26.
71. Id.
72. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (“London
Agreement”), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg
IMT].
73. Id. art. 6.
74. Mégret, supra note 16, at 27; see also Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 1 (stating
that the court is “hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern . . .”).
75. See Clapham, supra note 46, at 511 (discussing the various arguments for why
NSAs are bound by international law, and the responses those arguments will likely receive from the NSAs); see also Sassòli, supra note 11, at 3–6 (discussing how NSAs
might respond to various arguments about being bound by international humanitarian or
human rights laws).
76. The preamble of the U.N. Charter reads in pertinent part:
To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
To reaffirm faith in fundamental rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,
and
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mitted that the primary goal of its creation was state security. 77 Thus,
although the nations that gathered for the first assembly of the U.N.
agreed to the Charter, 78 the various NSAs the Charter hopes to govern
did not. So the U.N., acting as peace keeper for the globe, is challenged
to monitor the actions of a variety of groups who never authorized it to
exercise power over them.
The current architecture of international law is poorly equipped to prevent or resolve conflicts involving NSAs. The problem with the laws
governing conflict resolution is that although the international reality
grows more focused on NSAs, international laws remain focused on state
responsibilities. 79 Moreover, even where the rules apparently apply to the
NSA, there is seldom an actual international forum for the aggrieved party to seek relief and invoke the NSA’s responsibility. 80 This is largely
because the laws of war predate the recent explosion of NSAs onto the
global stage. As neither international humanitarian nor international
criminal law has seen development since 1998, 81 meaningful change
does not happen often.
Even politicians that applaud the U.N.’s successes 82 stress that if the
U.N. is to meet the challenges of providing collective security83 in the
To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.
U.N. Charter pmbl.
77. Anand Panyarachun, Chairman of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges,
and Change, highlighted this problem in his report which was presented by the SecretaryGeneral of the U.N. to the General Assembly. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19,
synopsis.
78. U.N. Charter, pmbl.
79. Sassòli, supra note 11, at 1–2 (arguing that not only are most of the international
rules state-centered, but the implementation mechanisms are even more so).
80. This is true regardless of whether the aggrieved party is an individual, an injured
State, an international organization, or a third party State. See id. at 2.
81. International humanitarian law, governed by the Geneva Conventions, was last
altered in 1977 with the addition of Protocol II. International criminal law is largely governed by the Rome Statute which was passed in 1998, and entered into force in 2002.
Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 30, 35.
82. Anand Panyarachun, the former Prime Minister of Thailand and the Chairman of
the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, starts his report to the Security
Council by applauding the U.N. for past successes, and insisting it has been more successful than people give it credit for. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, transmittal
letter.
83. At its founding, the U.N. thought of collective security as a collective response by
its members should the security of a state be put in jeopardy. High-Level Panel Report,
supra note 19, synopsis.
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21st century, major changes are needed. 84 This is partially because the
proliferation of NSAs has led observers to believe the importance of the
state is diminishing. 85 For a demonstration of this fact, one only has to
glance at a breakdown of the conflicts that have plagued the world between 1946 and 2002. In 1946 there were two inter-state wars as opposed
to ten ongoing civil wars, 86 While the number of inter-state wars has
never eclipsed six in a given year, the number of civil wars rose to fiftytwo in 1992, before settling down to thirty in 2002. 87 Considering that
the number of civil wars today is much higher than it was when the U.N.
was founded, it would be foolish to keep shaping international law in its
1945 image.
To understand why NSAs present such a challenge to the U.N., it is
important to consider the effectiveness of the laws discussed above. Part
A of this Section examines the U.N.’s use of sanctions and discusses why
they are an ineffective means of attaining compliance from NSAs. Next,
Part B discusses how the failures of international humanitarian law and
international human rights law stem from their being inapplicable. Finally, Part C argues that of the three, international criminal law provides the
best hope for policing the criminal activities of NSAs.
A. To Sanction, or Not to Sanction?
No proper discussion of the penalties associated with disregarding international law would be complete without an overview of U.N. based
sanctions. Following the Cold War, “peacemaking, peacekeeping and
post-conflict peacebuilding in civil wars [became] the operational face of
the United Nations in international peace and security.” 88 During this
same time period, the U.N. has turned to the use of sanctions with increasing frequency. 89 Its power to implement sanctions stems from Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which governs actions in response to a
84. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, transmittal letter.
85. See generally Muhittin Ataman, The Impact of Non-State Actors on World Politics: A Challenge to Nation-States, ALTERNATIVES: TURKISH J. OF INT’L RELATIONS, vol.
2,
no.
1,
2003,
available
at
http://www.alternativesjournal.net/volume2/number1/ataman2.htm.
86. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, fig.I.
87. See id. fig.I.
88. Id. ¶ 84.
89. For example, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq to force it out of Kuwait, to compel Serbia to stop aiding the Bosnian rebels, and to topple the Haitian military. See generally Renee B. Agress et al., The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Internal
Conflict: The Capacity and Preferences of Domestic Groups in Target States (paper presented at the annual meeting of Southern Political Science Association, Jan. 6, 2005); see
also Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT’L SEC. 90 (1997).
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breach of the peace. 90 Specifically, Article 41 provides for the use of
measures not involving force, “[including] complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” 91
At the discretion of the U.N. Security Council, sanctions can be broken
up into two categories: mandatory and voluntary. 92 While voluntary
sanctions are imposed at the discretion of the state, 93 mandatory sanctions are binding international law, and states must enact legislation to
put them into effect.94 This is because Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter
states that the Security Council’s responsibility is to maintain international peace and security, and to this extent, grants the Security Council
power to act on behalf of the other states.95 Furthermore, Article 25 of
the Charter provides that members of the U.N. “agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter.” 96 While both brands of sanctions are at the U.N.’s disposal, the
literature, 97 as well as this Note, focuses on mandatory sanctions. In the
years spanning 1991 to 1994, the U.N. Security Council imposed mandatory sanctions eight times, as opposed to twice between 1945 and 1990.98
Yet, sanctions in general are a questionable practice and are particularly ineffective in the case of NSAs. Despite the U.N.’s turning to sanc-

90. U.N. Charter ch. VII.
91. U.N. Charter art. 41. The Security Council also has the power to call on the parties involved to comply with the measures it deems necessary. Id. art. 40. The Security
Council is also allowed to call for the use of force if it deems Article 41 measures to be
inadequate. Id. art. 42.
92. Andrea Charron, UN Targeted Sanctions: Changing the Lens from Sanctions to
the Crisis Context 8 (paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 50th Annual
Convention, “Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future,” May 22, 2009), available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/1/4/1/p311419_inde
x.html (discussing how the methodology and targets of the sanctions are important to
gauge success).
93. Since the sending state has the right to ignore voluntary sanctions, it becomes
much more difficult to keep track of voluntary sanctions. Additionally, it is difficult to
determine the effectiveness of voluntary sanctions, since the discretionary element implies that they will not be applied uniformly. See id.
94. Id.; see also U.N. Charter arts. 24, 25.
95. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
96. Id. art. 25.
97. Voluntary sanctions have largely been ignored by literature on sanctions for a
variety of reasons. Among them is that the term “sanctions” typically refers to mandatory
sanctions. Furthermore, it is empirically easier to leave out voluntary sanctions because
mandatory sanctions provide clearer data. See Charron, supra note 92, at 8.
98. Pape, supra note 89, at 90.
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tions with increasing frequency, it is still unclear how frequently sanctions actually bring about the desired changes in the target regime. 99 Although proponents typically argue that sanctions can be as effective as
military force, 100 the first wave of research indicated that they were
not. 101 Logic dictates that the purpose behind sanctions is that the economic burden placed on the sanctioned nation’s population will cause
those citizens to grow dissatisfied with their government.102 This would
in turn cause the nation’s citizens to place internal pressure on the regime
to make the necessary changes desired by the U.N., leading to the lifting
of the sanctions. 103 Although recent studies have shown sanctions to be
more successful, that is largely because the definition of “success” has
been modified in a way that makes failure impossible. 104 One economic
analyst, David Baldwin, argues that whenever the target of attempted
influence is forced to pay any price for noncompliance, the sanctions
should be considered at least partially successful.105 Yet, this is blatantly
a circular definition of success. If a sanction is the imposition of some
burden on a country, and success is defined as burdening a noncompliant
country, every instance of a sanction must be, by definition, a success.
Baldwin’s definition is further flawed because it judges when “attempted” influence is successful. Clearly, when success is attained by
attempting something, it is not very difficult to achieve this standard. The
problem with such an over-inclusive definition is that it clouds the real
issue of whether desired changes actually resulted from the sanctions.
In avoiding the trap of defining sanctions too broadly, it is important to
distinguish between economic pressure and economic sanctions. Economic pressure tends to refer to one of three strategies: (1) economic
sanctions, 106 (2) trade wars, 107 and (3) economic warfare. 108 Of the three,

99. Agress, supra note 89, at 1.
100. Although reasonable people might differ on how effective war is as an “instrument of policy,” it is hard to argue for unnecessary wars. As such, the argument goes that
sanctions present a more humane alternative to resolving conflicts. See Pape, supra note
89, at 91 (citing DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT, 373 (1985)).
101. The first major wave of research done on the effectiveness of sanctions occurred
during the 1960s and 1970s. Pape, supra note 89, at 91; see also Johan Galtung, On the
Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,
19 WORLD POL. 378, 380 (1967).
102. Agress, supra note 89, at 1.
103. Under this view, economic sanctions might cause the citizens of a nation to engage in activities such as strikes, demonstrations, riots, and maybe even civil war. See id.;
see also Pape, supra note 89, at 94.
104. Pape, supra note 89, at 95.
105. Id. (citing DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT, 373 (1985)).
106. Defined infra note 109.
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only economic sanctions seek to lower the economic well-being of a target for the purpose of coercing the target to change its political behavior. 109 So while some lump all three categories under the term economic
sanctions, this is ill-advised. 110 What policy-makers are actually interested in is when economic pressure brings about desired policy changes. 111
If the barometer for success remains focused on bringing about an actual
regime or policy change, then the results remain less optimistic. 112 Historically, U.N. sanctions regimes 113 that target intrastate conflicts tend to
place the bulk of the sanctions against the state, despite the fact that the
focus of the literature is on the importance of targeted sanctions and
sanctioning individuals and entities. 114 In a case study of various sanctions regimes, regimes involving intrastate conflicts 115 were in place
longer than those involving interstate conflicts. 116 Furthermore, of the
civil wars occurring between 1993 and 2003 that triggered U.N.-led mediation, settlement resulted only about twenty-five percent of the time. 117
As such, when sanctions are considered in an appropriate context, their
effectiveness when NSAs are involved is questionable at best.
A possible explanation for why NSAs are not as responsive to sanctions is that they do not have the same responsibilities to their ‘citizens’

107. A trade war is when a state threatens to, or actually inflicts, economic harm
against another state in an attempt to persuade the other state to agree to terms that are
more favorable to the coercing state. JOHN A. CONYBEARE, TRADE WARS: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL RIVALRY 3–6 (1987).
108. Economic warfare is the strategic weakening of a target’s economy to in turn
afflict its military capabilities. This is typically done during a peacetime arms race or
during war. Pape, supra note 89, at 94.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Placing economic pressure on a state carries one or both of two purposes: punishing the target by depriving them of some material good, or making the target comply with
some goal that the punishing parties feel is important. As achieving both these goals will
not always be possible, it is imperative for the policy-maker to determine which one is
more important. See Galtung, supra note 101, at 379.
112. Pape, supra note 89, at 95; see also Galtung, supra note 101, at 380 (pointing out
that merely punishing a person is not likely to cause that person to comply with a given
set of goals).
113. A sanction regime refers to the totality of Security Council resolutions creating,
altering, or terminating sanctions that target a particular group or state. Charron, supra
note 92, at 4.
114. Id. at 15.
115. Intrastate conflicts are confined within the borders of one state. Id. at 3.
116. Interstate conflicts involve two or more countries. Id at 3, 16.
117. High-Level Panel, supra note 19, ¶ 86.
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as an actual government. 118 Often times, breeding discontent with the
ruling government might actually be their goal.119 Thus, the dissatisfaction with the regime that the U.N. is hoping to foster by sanctioning the
state may be the very same goal as the NSA’s. This is evidenced by the
fact that sanctions placed on regimes that had pre-existing political or
economic problems were of limited effect.120 Historically, these targeted
regimes frequently stood to gain from persisting with their illegal activities. 121 Some extremist groups actually stand to gain from regional instability resulting from conflicts, since state collapse or the emergence of
ungoverned regions can create safe havens for NSAs. 122 Intuitively, it
makes little sense for an organization that is dedicated to illegal activity
to start adhering to the law simply because the U.N. has asked them to.
Sanctions are an exercise of international law, and criminals, by the nature of their name, are law breakers.
B. IHL and IHRL: Do They Even Apply?
Hoping that NSAs will adhere to given rules or principles falsely presupposes that they are actually bound by them. This is the biggest problem with holding NSAs responsible for violating international human
rights law. International human rights law binds states, 123 and this becomes the focus of the argument when NSAs enter the picture. Even
prominent defenders of human rights admit there are good reasons that
international human rights law does not apply to NSAs. 124 For instance,
human rights activist Liesbeth Zegveld acknowledges that it is inappropriate to hold NSAs responsible for violating international human rights

118. For instance, NSAs are unlikely to have the capacity to provide their members
with certain rights like the access to courts. See Clapham, supra note 46, at 502.
119. This is the logical implication of a situation where the NSA is a rebel group seeking to challenge the State’s power. See id. at 511.
120. Agress, supra note 89, at 11.
121. In some cases, warlords generate such a degree of profit from their economic
networks, that they can actually withstand the economic sanctions. That is, it is more
profitable for the warlords to persist in spite of the sanctions than to listen to the U.N. See
id. at 11.
122. These were observations made by the U.S. Department of Defense in its annual
strategy report in 2008. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY, 2–3 (2008)
DEFENSE
STRATEGY],
available
at
[hereinafter
U.S.
www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf.
123. See Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 33.
124. There is some support indicating that NSAs do have human rights obligations, but
the majority of the support stems from international soft law bodies, pronouncements of
NGOs, and scholarly writing. See Sassòli, supra note 11, at 3.

2011]

DEFINING AGGRESSION FOR NON-STATE ACTORS

663

law, as these are rights that people hold exclusively against the state. 125
While some scholars argue that NSAs have responsibilities under human
rights law because some of them have elements of government authority, 126 this argument still leaves the door open for rebel groups that do not
take on such authority to circumvent these obligations.127
Despite the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says
that “everyone has duties to the community,” 128 the traditional view is
that human rights laws bind states, not individuals.129 A report from the
U.N. Economic and Social Council admitted that although all parties felt
that NSAs should be responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and international criminal law, some felt that only states could
violate international human rights law. 130 As such, the Council found it
important to proceed with caution, so as not to mistakenly suggest that
NSAs may be accountable under international human rights law. 131 If the
U.N. does not believe that NSAs should be held accountable for violations of human rights laws, there is little reason to think that the NSAs
will take the prerogative and bind themselves to these laws.
On the question of whether international humanitarian law binds
NSAs, those that argue in the affirmative point to Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions. 132 Specifically, Article 3 includes the wording
“each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions.” 133 At face value, this indicates that NSAs should

125. Clapham, supra note 46, at 503 (citing LIESBETH ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF
ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 49–51 (2002)).
126. Id. at 502 (citing Christian Tomuschat, The Applicability of Human Rights Law to
Insurgent Movements, in KRISENSICHERUNG UND HUMANITARER SCHUTZ—CRISIS
MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 573–91, 588 (Horst Fisher et al. eds.,
2004)) (arguing that in some instances, elements of government authority might fall into
the hands of a rebel movement).
127. See id. at 502 (pointing out that it is a well-known principle that governments and
international organizations are reluctant to admit that rebel groups are acting in a government-like way).
128. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/217(III), art. 29 (Dec. 10, 1948).
129. William A. Schabas, Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-International Armed
Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 907, 908 (2003).
130. The Right to a Remedy, supra note 47, ¶ 18.
131. Principle 3 of the report sought to distinguish between international humanitarian
and human rights law, and between state actors and NSAs. The report admits that legal
and administrative measures may not always be sufficient for prevention purposes. Id. ¶¶
14–21.
132. See Sassòli, supra note 11, at 3.
133. Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316.
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be bound by international humanitarian law. However, that claim also
completely overlooks reasoning from the perspective of NSAs for why
they are not. Specifically, arguments that they are bound to international
treaties may be rejected by parties that had no role in the process of their
enactment. 134
Some scholars argue that it is a simple matter of the NSAs being a
component of a state which accepted a treaty and, as such, are compelled
to abide by said treaty. 135 However, arguments that they should be bound
by national laws are irrelevant considering many NSAs refuse to acknowledge the state’s legitimacy to make laws in the first place. 136 While
some NSAs may be coerced to follow international laws if they have aspirations of becoming the governing state, many others are simply content with gaining control over specific areas or the opportunity to “run
organized criminal activity.” 137 Thus, it intuitively follows that where a
group’s specific goal is to violate a given set of laws, they are both aware
of the repercussions and are either not concerned, or are willing to accept
them. In either scenario, where the law’s purpose is to prevent violation
by parties who refuse to accept its legitimacy, it is destined to fail.
There is, however, the argument that since customary international
humanitarian law is founded on practice and is applicable against everyone, the fact that NSAs did not ratify these customary laws is irrelevant. 138 Yet currently, only state activities can create customary international law.139 The activities of NSAs are only considered when they succeed in becoming the ruling government of their state. 140 Thus, this argument is defective because it still tries to pigeon hole NSAs in a set of
laws they have no part in creating. Whether the laws are signed on paper
and created formally or enacted in a de facto manner, they are still a

134. Clapham, supra note 46, at 511; see also Sassòli, supra note 11, at 17.
135. This idea suggests that the state has accepted a rule and is bound by that rule. In
turn, the state is made up of not only the government, but of the entire population including both individuals and collective groups. See Eric David, International Humanitarian
Law and Non-State Actors: Synopsis of the Issue, 27 COLLEGIUM (SPECIAL ISSUE) 27, 35
(2003).
136. See Clapham, supra note 46, at 511.
137. Id.; cf. David, supra note 135, at 35–36 (arguing that international humanitarian
law applies to national liberation movements where they seek to be recognized as the
legitimate government).
138. See Henckaerts, Binding Armed Opposition Groups, supra note 39, at 128.
139. Id.
140. This limitation ignores the important role that activities of NSAs who do not succeed in becoming the official government play in international law. Given that by definition, a NSA must be involved in non-international armed conflicts, failed rebel groups
could dictate the conduct of future NSAs in such conflicts. Id.
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creation of states. Furthermore, even if the argument to give customary
law universal recognition is accepted, this still overlooks the fact that
when the laws are applicable to NSAs, there is seldom a forum to enforce
the laws against them. 141 As the next Section points out, the creation of
such forums is one reason why international criminal law is so important
for holding NSAs accountable for breaking the law.
C. The Best Hope
Given that the antiquity of the law is one of the problems with policing
NSAs, international criminal law is particularly interesting because of the
recent opportunity for development. When the Rome Statute was put into
force on July 1, 2002,142 it included a predestined review.143 For this purpose, from May 31 to June 10, 2010, Kampala, Uganda hosted a conference for the ASP to the ICC. 144 One item on the agenda at this review
was establishing a legal definition for the crime of aggression.145 Prior to
this review, the Rome Statute failed to define the term aggression, making jurisdiction over the crime inoperable.146 Although the ASP drafted
an amendment defining the crime, the court cannot exercise this jurisdiction until January 1, 2017 at the earliest. 147 Since international criminal
law is arguably the most capable branch of law at dealing with NSAs, the
ASP missed a unique opportunity to update the legal mechanisms governing conflicts by adopting a state focused definition of aggression.
One reason international criminal law stands out from international humanitarian and human rights law is because at its core, it is criminal law.
Unlike the other two branches of law, criminal law is implicitly applied
against people that disagree with it. The emergence of international criminal law is related to the rise of a strong central international power in the
same way that national criminal law is linked to the rise of the state.148
For example, in a local government, laws criminalizing murder and arson
are created by the public for the welfare of the public, irrelevant of how

141. Sassòli, supra note 11, at 2.
142. Rome Statute, supra note 51.
143. This review is planned to include, but not be limited to, “the list of crimes contained in article 5,” and is to be open to “those participating in the ASP.” Id. art. 123.
144. Review Conference of the Rome Statute, supra note 15.
145. Also planned for Uganda is: a discussion of the court’s performance thus far, a
review of article 124 which allows nations to postpone the court’s exercise of jurisdiction
over war crimes, and two amendments to the Rome Statute proposed by Belgium and
Mexico. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Rome Statute Amendments, supra note 17, art. 15.
148. Mégret, supra note 16, at 2.
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murderers and arsonists feel about them. Expanding this idea to the international context, international criminal law represents certain values
that the international community holds with such esteem that they “transcend its typical value neutrality.” 149 Since this area of law is geared to
criminalize individual misconduct, there is no reason it cannot criminalize the misconduct of individuals not associated with the state.150 Where
the argument that NSAs never agreed to the treaties might effectively
explain why international humanitarian or human rights law do not apply, the idea of international criminal law is to police individuals, not the
states. 151 Thus, there are no legal or logical problems with criminalizing
aggression by NSAs; 152 the only obstacle comes from the actual definition. In contrast to the typical pattern of state-centered international law,
defining aggression under international criminal law means individuals
can be charged with the crime. 153
For this reason, the definition of aggression adopted by the ASP to the
Rome Statute limits the powers of the branch of law most effective at
policing NSAs. In contrast to the laws of international armed conflicts,
parallel laws in internal armed conflicts were poorly developed until the
1990s. 154 Prior to the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals, 155 there was no
international treaty even imposing criminal responsibility on individuals
not associated with the state, let alone actually holding them accountable. 156 In the same vein that these tribunals have been used to prosecute

149. This usually results from a “densification” of the international system. In such a
situation certain principles become so prized that they “pierce through the sovereign veil”
and criminalize conduct that would traditionally be left entirely to national governments.
See id. at 2–3.
150. Antonio Cassese, On Some Problematic Aspects of the Crime of Aggression, 20
LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 841, 846 (2007).
151. Mégret, supra note 16, at 4.
152. As a general principle, international criminal law seeks to protect the international
community from the acts of specific individuals. Thus, there is nothing in the functioning
of this branch of law that would restrain a court from prosecuting a NSA for a particular
crime. See Cassese, supra note 150, at 846.
153. Id. (arguing that crime of aggression should be applicable to NSAs, since the
body of law that is defining the crime is already focused on individuals).
154. ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICTS 257 (2008).
155. These tribunals, established in the early 1990s, will be discussed in detail, infra
Part III.
156. There is a distinction between responsibility and accountability. Responsibility
refers to when a law is applicable to a given person, whereas accountability refers to actually enforcing the laws after a person violates them. Without first establishing responsibility, there can be no accountability. See Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of Non-State
Actors in International Law, 27 COLLEGIUM (SPECIAL ISSUE) 153, 153–54 (2003).
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NSAs for violating international criminal law, the Rome Statute has empowered the ICC to enforce similar rules.157 As such, the jurisprudence
flowing from the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals, as well as the definition of war crimes under the Rome Statute are accredited as predominant
reasons for the merger of the laws of international armed conflicts and
the laws governing non-international conflicts. 158 Currently, with limited
exceptions, there is at least a presumption that the laws of international
armed conflict apply to internal conflicts.159
In this manner, international criminal law has actually been used as a
vehicle of enforcement for other branches. Genocide, 160 crimes against
humanity and war crimes are among the crimes listed under the Rome
Statute. 161 Crimes against humanity are the wide spread targeting of civilians for acts of murder, enslavement, torture, etc. 162 War crimes are in
turn defined as any grave violation of the Geneva Conventions of
1949. 163 The U.N. has explicitly found that genocide is a violation of
human rights, 164 and acts such as torture and enslavement have been
called human rights violations by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 165 Additionally, since the Geneva Conventions of 1949
is one of the central treaties of international humanitarian law, 166 war
crimes are clearly also a violation of humanitarian law. Thus, the ICC
has recognized that at least certain violations of international humanitarian and human rights law are criminal. The Commission on Human

157. Id. at 155; see also Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 28.
158. Internal armed conflicts implicitly involve NSAs, and armed conflicts implicitly
involve the use of force. Thus, developments in this area of law provide analogous support for how the use of force by NSAs should be treated in an international setting. KOLB
& HYDE, supra note 154, at 259–60.
159. These exceptions are the status of combatants and prisoners of war, and the laws
of occupied territories. Id. at 259.
160. In sum and substance, this crime is defined as an act of violence committed with
“intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”
Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 6.
161. Id. art. 5.
162. Id. art. 7.
163. Id. art. 8.
164. The U.N. has also found that the crimes which constitute genocide might also
qualify as crimes against humanity or war crimes, depending on the context in which they
are committed. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR ON THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE
http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/adviser/genocide.shtml (last visited Feb 22, 2011).
165. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976) (recognizing that individuals have duties and responsibilities to
others in the community to which they belong).
166. See Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 30.
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Rights has also formally acknowledged that individual responsibility for
human rights violations should be pursued by criminal courts.167 The implication of this recognition is that while scholars debate whether those
branches of law apply to NSAs, the ICC already stands as an institute
capable of prosecuting NSAs for those violations.
As such, international criminal law has become arguably the main vehicle used for ensuring NSAs are held accountable for international
crimes. 168 Examples include a UK conviction of an Afghan warlord for
torture. 169 Further evidence is offered by the Rwanda and Yugoslavia
tribunals’ prosecution of members from various NSAs accused of committing crimes against humanity. 170 The aforementioned tribunals
claimed their first successful conviction of a leader of a non-state group
in 1999. 171 To date, Yugoslavia has adjudicated 121 cases (both NSAs
and state actors) 172 while Rwanda has adjudicated 49. 173 As such, both
courts are recognized as an important step in holding NSAs accountable
for international crimes. 174 Furthermore, the ICC should build on what
these other IMTs have started. As the Rome Statute’s entry into force in
2002 marked an important step in deterring war crimes, 175 the ICC has
the opportunity to expand on the success of past tribunals because its
reach is not limited territorially or by time.

167. Schabas, supra note 129, at 908; see also Impunity, U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, C.H.R. res. 1998/54, ESCOR Supp. No. 3, at 177, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54
(Apr. 17, 1998) (discussing methods for combating impunity towards human rights violations).
168. See REDRESS TRUST, TORTURE BY NON-STATE ACTORS: A PRIMER (2006) [hereinafter
TORTURE
BY
NON-STATE
ACTORS],
available
at
http://www.irct.org/Files//Filer/IPIP/training/Torture_by_Non-State_Actors-Primer.pdf.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Zegveld, supra note 156, at 155.
172. Eleven people were acquitted, sixty-one were sentenced, thirteen were referred to
national jurisdictions for prosecution, and thirty-six had their indictments withdrawn or
are deceased. Key Figures of ICTY Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last visited Jan. 15,
2011).
173. Thirty-one cases ended in a successful prosecution, nine are pending appeal, eight
resulted in acquittals, and one person died before the trial ended. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Status of Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
http://www.unictr.org/Cases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
174. See In-Depth Reports: Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict, IRINNEWS.ORG
(March
2003),
http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=31&ReportId=70542 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2011).
175. Id.
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At present, the ICC is monitoring four situations: The Democratic Republic of Congo, The Central African Republic, Uganda, and Darfur,
Sudan. 176 Of a combined thirteen cases in these four situations, the ICC
has five of their targets in custody, either standing or awaiting trial. 177
Although the outcomes of these cases are far from determined, the fact
that these men have been removed from the arena where they committed
an assortment of horrifying crimes is a positive step. That they will be
forced to face justice is even more reason to applaud the efforts and potential of the ICC.
III. THE 2010 FALLOUT: THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
In 2010, the ASP to the Rome Statute met to review the ICC and
amend the Rome Statute. 178 Article 5 of the Rome Statute gives the ICC
jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and aggression. 179 However, while the court exercises authority
over the first three crimes, Article 5(2) provides that the ICC will only
exercise jurisdiction over aggression after it is defined. 180 Created at the
same time as the Rome Statute’s enactment, a Special Working Group
(“SWG”) was tasked with filling this void.181 In 2008, a discussion paper
was distributed by the SWG containing its proposed definition of aggression. 182 The definition that passed in 2010 is identical to the one distributed in 2008 and establishes the elements of the crime as: (1) the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of the use of armed force, (2) a
crime conducted by an individual who has a high-level of control over
the political or military actions of a state, and (3) committed against
another sovereign state. 183 The two most disappointing aspects of this
amendment are that it focuses exclusively on individuals in a policy176. See
ICC:
All
Situations,
INT’L
CRIMINAL
COURT,
http://www2.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/ (last visited Jan. 15,
2011).
177. See ICC: All Cases, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www2.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Cases/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
178. For details of this conference, see supra Part II(c).
179. Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 5.
180. This was even accounted for by the Rome Statute. Article 121 provides procedures for amending the statute, while Article 123 provides for a mandatory review seven
years after the Statute goes into force. Rome Statute, supra note 51, arts. 121, 123.
181. The review session scheduled for 2010 was likewise agreed upon at the same time
this group was created. In the News, supra note 14.
182. Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression Proposed by the Chairman (Revision June 2008), ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/2 (May 14, 2008)
[hereinafter ICC Discussion Paper].
183. Compare id., with Rome Statute Amendments, supra note 17, art. 15(2).

670

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 36:2

making capacity and restricts the crime of aggression to something only
states are capable of.
Given the current international climate, this amendment falls short of
meeting the goals of the original Rome Statute and international criminal
law in general and fails to keep up with the reality of evolving conflict
patterns. Part A of this Section discusses the impact of a working definition of aggression and which parties will be implicated by the new definition. Next, Part B points out that this definition steps away from the
norms and principles which have governed international criminal law
practically since its creation.
A. Aggression: What’s in a Word?
Formally defining the act of aggression under the Rome Statute puts
the initiation of military action within the purview of the law. Aggression
differs from other war crimes because it is a crime of jus ad bellum,
while the others are crimes of jus in bello. 184 Whereas the latter refers to
criminal violations during the execution of a war, the former refers to
criminal violations in initiating a war. 185 Thus, even if a state was to conduct a military operation in a legal manner, its mere initiation might be
against the law. This idea is not new; dating back to the Nuremberg IMT,
aggression was called the “mother of all crimes.” 186 Furthermore, the
U.N. General Assembly met specifically to define the crime, highlighting
the importance of a definition for the “most serious and dangerous form
of the illegal use of force.” 187 The General Assembly adopted a definition
of aggression in 1974. 188
In adopting the 2010 amendment on aggression, the ASP missed a valuable opportunity to improve the laws policing NSAs. By enacting an
amendment defining the crime of aggression, the ICC will finally be able
to exercise the inoperable jurisdiction it has held since 2002.189 The conference had the opportunity to update the outdated norms governing the

184. Mégret, supra note 16, at 13.
185. Id.
186. Under the Nuremberg IMT, aggression was embodied by the larger crime of
“crimes against the peace.” See id.
187. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).
188. In sum and substance, the U.N. defined aggression as “the use of armed force by a
state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set
out in this Definition.” Id. art. 1.
189. See id.; see also In the News, supra note 14. This is contingent on approval by the
State Parties to the Rome Statute come Jan 1, 2017. Rome Statute Amendments, supra
note 17, art 15(2).
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use of force by NSAs 190 while improving the international community’s
ability to hold NSAs accountable for humanitarian violations. Yet, the
definition which was accepted overlooks the reality that NSAs are increasingly responsible for acts violating international laws. As the HighLevel Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change stated, “[t]he norms
governing the use of force by non-state actors have not kept pace with
those pertaining to states.” 191 Thus, the question that must be considered
is whether aggression is a crime that only states are capable of committing. With this question in mind, an examination of past conflicts indicates that the amendment, if approved in 2017,192 will lead to undesirable
outcomes.
For instance, activities of terrorist groups indicate that NSAs are capable of using armed force on an international level. Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter provides for the use of self-defense when a state suffers an armed
attack. 193 Using self-help measures is allowed so long as the Security
Council has not taken action yet. 194 Although the Security Council never
explicitly approved of the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, there is little doubt
that the 9/11 terrorist act was of sufficient gravity to constitute an armed
attack under the U.N. Charter. 195 Thus, it is evident that at least some
NSAs are capable of using armed force on an international level. Yet,
while the purpose of criminalizing aggression is to police the initiation of
force, using the new definition retrospectively evidences that members of
Al-Qaida would escape responsibility for criminal aggression. Given that
the resultant damages are the same, it is difficult to accept such an outcome.
On the other hand, humanitarian intervention 196 might be a criminal
act. Again looking to the past, in 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) bombed Yugoslavia without authority from the U.N.

190. High-Level Panel, supra note 19, ¶ 159.
191. Id.
192. Rome Statute Amendments, supra note 17, art 15(2).
193. “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.” U.N. Charter art. 51.
194. Norman G. Printer Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors Under International Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 331, 354 (2003).
195. Id. at 353.
196. Humanitarian intervention envisions the use of armed force, not in self-defense,
but rather as a means of preventing widespread human rights violations. Sean D. Murphy,
Criminalizing Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 341, 341 (2009).

672

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 36:2

Security Council. 197 This was defended by former U.S. President Clinton
as “just and necessary,” and done in reaction to ethnic cleansing of Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo. 198 Despite such rationalizations,
NATO is an organization of states, this type of bombing is actually listed
as an example of unlawful aggression, 199 and Yugoslavia was a sovereign state. 200 As such, NATO’s efforts to end the ethnic cleansing 201
may very well have constituted criminal aggression. 202 Whether unilateral humanitarian intervention should ever be justified is a controversial
issue and most scholars and states believe it should not. 203 This Note
makes no attempt to weigh in on that debate, but criminalizing humanitarian intervention while simultaneously tying the ICC’s hands with regards to large-scale terrorist attacks hardly seems like a consistent way of
policing the use of armed force.
In the same manner that the new amendment is under-inclusive, there
is an argument that including NSAs under the crime of aggression might
have undesirable consequences. Mainly, there is concern about how developments in criminalizing aggression might affect the right to armed
struggle. 204 The right to armed struggle refers to people under “occupation, apartheid, and alien domination,” and their ability to use armed
force against a suppressive regime. 205 Ignoring that whether there is a
right to armed struggle is contested by some, 206 this is not a compelling

197. Gavin Murray-Miller, Beyond Tragedy: NATO’s Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia 20–21 (unpublished thesis, California State University, Fresno) (on file with
California State University, Fresno, History Department).
198. Id. at 21 (justifying the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo against claims that it
was merely an act of the U.S. and NATO exporting their own ideals).
199. “Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State.” ICC
Discussion Paper, supra note 182, art. 8 bis(2)(b).
200. See Murray-Miller, supra note 197, at 22.
201. See id. at 20.
202. Murphy, supra note 196, at 366–367 (arguing that if the ICC does not prosecute
attacks like NATO’s incursion into Kosovo as aggression under the SWG’s definition of
the crime, they will in a sense be showing approval of unilateral humanitarian intervention).
203. Id. at 345.
204. Liaquat Ali Khan, Legal Commentary: The Changing Right of Armed Struggle,
CHRON.
&
SENTINEL
(Sept.
16,
2005),
BALT.
www.baltimorechronicle.com/2005/091605AliKhan.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2011)
(discussing how developments in international law, particularly in response to terrorism
and the war on terror, are muddling the right to armed struggle).
205. See id.
206. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶ 160 (discussing the major stopping
points for coming to an agreement for a definition of terrorism).
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reason to have a blanket exclusion of NSAs from the crime of aggression. The ICC has a built in discretionary valve; it can only hear cases for
“the most serious crimes.” 207 Additionally, the new definition of aggression is restricted to acts “which by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the [U.N.].” 208 The use of
threshold language like ‘most serious’ in the Rome Statute 209 and ‘manifest violation’ in the amendment 210 indicates that the ICC will be allotted discretion in prosecution. Thus, it is imaginable that if a liberation
movement were to come to the ICC’s attention, they could choose to not
prosecute them for aggression. Since the right to armed struggle is presently unimpeded by the U.N. Charter or Resolution 3314, 211 there is no
reason to think that discretionary prosecution under the ICC would impact this right. Thus, whereas the ICC can work around an over-inclusive
definition covering all NSAs, an under-inclusive definition completely
carving out NSAs leaves the court no say in the matter.
Another potential problem with recognizing NSAs as capable of aggression is the implications on the right to self-defense. Recognizing
something as an act of aggression implies an armed attack occurred, 212
and an armed attack typically implicates reprisal under Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter. 213 Since a NSA exists within the boundaries of a state,
there is concern about retaliation against a state that houses the NSA, but
who was not involved in the attack. 214 Ignoring that the U.S.’s reaction to
9/11 already suggests the legality of such responses, 215 which is not necessarily a bad outcome. One state’s sufferance of another’s sovereignty
requires that each polices the activities of its residents that might harm
civilians within and without its borders. 216 A core principle of interna207. Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 1.
208. Rome Statute Amendments, supra note 17, art 8(1).
209. Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 1.
210. Rome Statute Amendments, supra note 17, art 8(1).
211. Kahn, supra note 204, at 2 (arguing that despite the developments associated with
the war on terror, international law has not formally “repudiated the right to armed struggle”).
212. Under the SWG’s proposed definition of aggression, the crime involves the use of
armed force. See ICC Discussion Paper, supra note 182, art 8 bis(2).
213. U.N. Charter art. 51 (the occurrence of an armed attack is the necessary trigger to
justify a state engaging in self defense).
214. Eric A. Heinze, Nonstate Actors in the International Legal Order: The IsraeliHezbollah Conflict and the Law of Self-Defense, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 87, 88 (2009).
215. See id.
216. See Lloyd R. Cohen, The Missing Currency of Israeli/Palestinian Negotiations 3
(Geo. Mason L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 09-45, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1467863 (discussing a hypothetical situation in which terrorists
based in Canada conducted attacks across the border into the U.S. on a regular basis).
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tional law is that when one state fails to protect its neighbors from criminal activity stemming from within that state’s borders, it forfeits its right
to have its sovereignty respected. 217
While such a principle might seem unduly harsh, it could in fact serve
a positive purpose. For instance, states may be discouraged from acquiescing in the illegal activities of NSAs within their borders.218 Where
a state knows it will be the target of retaliatory self-defense, it might be
motivated to take decisive steps to actively circumvent NSAs suspected
of engaging in the illegal use of force. 219 To prevent such situations,
many states have provisions in their criminal codes forbidding the state’s
citizens from engaging in aggressive acts against other sovereign
states. 220 Furthermore, there is still the threshold issue. Including NSAs
in the definition of criminal aggression would not automatically trigger
the right to self-defense against all NSAs; the ICC has discretion to
charge an individual of committing the crime. In a situation where the
ICC does not charge a NSA with committing aggression, armed conflicts
under Article 51 would not be implicated. Thus, the normative framework of the ICC is equipped to handle the potential dangers of finding
NSAs capable of aggression.
B. State vs. State . . . Really?
Given that both international criminal law and the Rome Statute focus
on the individual, irrelevant of his or her affiliation, this amendment’s
focus on the state is contradictory to international criminal law. The
Rome Statute declares it “shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity.” 221 Yet, the SWG insisted on keeping the “control or direct” requirement as part of the definition, claiming
it coincides with the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs. 222 However, the actual

217. See id.
218. See id. at 4.
219. See id.
220. Japan makes it a crime to prepare or plot to “wage war privately upon a foreign
State.” Austria’s criminal code forbids anyone on its soil from undertaking in acts to
“change the constitution of a foreign state or to divide territory which is part of a foreign
state by force or threat of force.” Sweden forbids a person from, “by violent means or
foreign aid, [causing] a danger of the Realm being involved in a war or other hostilities.”
Joachim Gewehr, Defining Aggression for the International Criminal Court: A Proposal
(Jan. 2003) (unpublished L.L.M. dissertation, University of Cape Town) (on file with
University of Cape Town).
221. Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 27(1).
222. See Kevin Jon Heller, Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership Requirement in
the Crime of Aggression, 18 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 477, 479 (2007).
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case law flowing from these tribunals tells a different story. 223 The jurisprudence of international tribunals and courts as well as relevant practice indicates that NSAs can incur criminal responsibility, both independently and through the grounds of command responsibility. 224 It is an
anomaly that this amendment defines aggression as a crime that is committed not only by states, against states, but also only by individuals in “a
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or
military action of a State.” 225
Both historically and today, the prime subject of international criminal
law is the individual. 226 The Nuremburg Trials famously pointed out that
“crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced.” 227 Not only was the use
of “abstract entities” presumably a reference to states, but this dictum is
often cited as the birth of contemporary international criminal law. 228
Furthermore, the Nuremberg IMT provided that the crime of aggression
could be committed by people not formally associated with the Nazi party, 229 and that “Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself. He had
to have cooperation of statesman, military leaders, diplomats, and businessman.” 230 Clearly the inclusion of businessman with statesman and
military leaders shows the Nuremberg IMT was not preoccupied with
state actors, let alone exclusively with high level leaders. By restricting
the focus of an international crime under the purview of the ICC in accordance with the 2010 amendment, the very principles on which international criminal law was founded are put into question.
Following World War II, the Statutes of the Nuremburg and Tokyo
IMTs were amongst the first to take aim at making the initiation of mili-

223. See id.
224. See TORTURE BY NON-STATE ACTORS, supra note 168 (comparing the international frameworks of international humanitarian, human rights, and criminal law, and their
application to NSAs).
225. ICC Discussion Paper, supra note 182, 8 bis(1).
226. See Mégret, supra note 16, at 4.
227. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL:
PROCEEDINGS
466
(1946),
available
at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-XXII.pdf.
228. It is also believed that the founding principle of the Nuremberg IMT is the punishment of the individual, not the associated state. See Mégret, supra note 16, at 4.
229. See Heller, supra note 222, at 480.
230. WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNALS, NUREMBURG, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 62 (1947) available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Nazi-opinion-judgment.pdf.
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tary conflicts an international crime. 231 Specifically, the Statute for the
Nuremberg IMT described “crimes against the peace” as “planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participating in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of the foregoing.” 232 This definition is particularly interesting because, in addition
to explicitly using the term “aggression,” it does not mention the state,
nor does it reference rank. Thus, comparing the definition found in the
Statute of the Nuremberg IMT against the one in the 2010 amendment
indicates that the ICC is stepping away from principles elucidated by the
Nuremberg IMT.
A more liberal reading of the Nuremberg IMT’s definition is evidenced
by the successful prosecution of Artur Greiser for crimes against the
peace. While serving as one of the leaders of the Nazi party in Danzig,
Greiser and other Danzig Leaders worked in conjunction with the Central
German Authorities to plan, direct, and execute attacks against Poland. 233
He was prosecuted by the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland, which
relied on various elements of International Law, including the Statute of
the Nuremberg IMT. 234 Despite linking Greiser to Hitler as a coconspirator, the Tribunal also held that his violations of international law
were a result of “Hitler’s orders,” and came as a result of “direct and indirect orders from the accused.” 235 The Tribunal’s finding that Greiser
violated international law by acting on Hitler’s orders seems to implicitly
signal that they did not consider him acting in the capacity of a policymaker. 236 In the context of the new definition, the conviction of Artur
Greiser shows that international criminal law has long committed itself to

231. Mark Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the
Gains?, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Working Paper No. 2008-43, 4
(2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301003 (providing a background on the
crime of aggression to provide context for the present debate over the SWG’s definition).
232. Nuremberg IMT, supra note 72, art. 6(a).
233. Drumbl, supra note 231, at 9.
234. Sources of law that the Tribunal relied on included: international treaties, the
Covenant of the League of Nations, the Statute of the Nuremberg IMT, and a nonaggression pact signed between Germany and Poland in 1934. Id.
235. See Trial of Gauleiter Artur Greiser, vol. 13 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 70, 92 (1949), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LawReports_Vol-13.pdf (charging Artur Greiser with a number of crimes, including aggression).
236. Although the court did not directly address the issue of policy-maker, the fact that
the court found that Greiser carried out Hitler’s orders implies that he was not responsible
for the policies behind such orders. See Drumbl, supra note 231, at 11.
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holding the individual responsible for their own actions, rather than just
targeting the relevant policy-maker through command responsibility.
Further evidence on the Nuremberg IMT’s liberal stance on defining
aggression is provided by the prosecution of two NSAs. Although both
men were acquitted, Hjalmar Schacht 237 and Albert Speer 238 were both
businessmen prosecuted for crimes against the peace. 239 In both cases,
the IMT specifically stated that private economic actors could be responsible for the crime of aggression. 240 Schacht was only acquitted because
the prosecution failed to prove he had actually taken part in the Nazi Party’s plan to wage aggressive war, or that he had knowledge that his work
to rearm Germany was part of such a plan. 241 Similarly, Speer was acquitted because he began his work after the war had commenced, so he
could not have been part of the conspiracy to wage aggressive war. 242
What both have in common is that they were acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove elements of the crime charged, not because of
their status as private economic actors. While neither man belonged to a
non-state armed group, both were recognized as capable of committing
the crime of aggression while serving in a non-government capacity. 243
International law following the Nuremberg IMT also indicates that
NSAs can commit the crime of aggression. The principles established by
the Nuremberg IMT were reaffirmed two months later when the Allied
Powers enacted Control Council Law No. 10 (“CCL 10”). 244 CCL 10
was meant to codify the underlying principles of the IMT judgments, 245
while establishing additional IMTs in the occupied German zones under

237. Schacht was the President of the Reichbank from 1933–1939, Minister of economics from 1934–1937, and Plenipotentiary General for War Economy from 1935–
1937. However, he began to lose authority in 1936, had no important government position by 1939, and was in a concentration camp from 1944 until the end of the war. Secretariat, Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression, 38–49, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1 (Jan. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Historical Review].
238. Speer became the “Reich Minister of Armaments and a member of the Central
Planning Board in 1942.” Id. at 41.
239. These two men are accredited for being the most responsible for Germany’s
rearmament. See Heller, supra note 222, at 480.
240. Id.
241. Thus, given that the crime has a mens rea, it is the prosecution’s job to prove
every element. So although Schacht participated in the rearmament, the prosecution could
not show he had subjective knowledge of the purpose of the rearmament. See id. at 481.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 480; see also Historical Review, supra note 237, at 39, 41.
244. CCL 10 was passed two months after the IMT defendants were sentenced. Heller,
supra note 222, at 482.
245. Id.
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U.S. and French control. 246 In this vein, the definitions for “crimes
against the peace” were very similar under the Nuremberg IMT and CCL
10, 247 with the latter arguably taking an even more liberal approach. CCL
10 stated that the actions listed, which constituted waging aggressive
war, were non-exhaustive. 248 The law provided that the crime of aggression could be committed by a person who “held a high political, civil or
military (including General Staff) position in Germany or in one of its
Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or held high position in the financial,
industrial or economic life of any such country.” 249 Since the Nuremberg
IMT found NSAs were capable of committing the crime of aggression, it
logically follows that CCL 10’s more expansive definition does as well.
Moreover, the fact that the terms “co-belligerents or satellites” are listed
in addition to Germany and its allies provides further evidence that the
crime encompassed NSAs.
The results of the post-World War II IMTs reached beyond the Allied
Powers, and were formally indoctrinated by the U.N. On December 11,
1946, the U.N. passed Resolution 95, which affirmed the “principles of
the international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.” 250 As such, all states that were
party to the U.N. at that time accepted the definitions provided by the
Nuremberg IMT, as well as how such definitions were interpreted.251
Between the IMTs relating to World War II and the creation of the ICC
are the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (“ICTFY”). Prior
to 1990, the question of command responsibility for the leaders of NSAs
had never come before an international tribunal. 252 In the Aleksovski
case 253 of 1999, the ICTFY ignored arguments that command responsi-

246. See id.; see also Historical Review, supra note 237, at 44.
247. See Historical Review, supra note 237, at 44.
248. Id. at 45.
249. NUREMBERG TRIALS FINAL REPORT APPENDIX D: CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10
art. II (2)(f) (Dec. 20, 1945), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp.
250. Cassese, supra note 150, at 842; see also G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/95
(I) (Dec. 11, 1946).
251. See Cassese, supra note 150, at 842.
252. Zegveld, supra note 156, at 154.
253. In The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, the accused was a prison warden, who
was responsible for subjecting prisoners to “excessive and cruel interrogation, physical
and psychological harm, forced labour (digging trenches), in hazardous circumstances,
being used as human shields and some were murdered or otherwise killed.” Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 25, 1999) [hereinafter Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T], available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4146e8ba2.pdf.
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bility could only apply to people in official roles. 254 The court held that
“superior responsibility is thus not reserved for official authorities,” and
instead extended liability to an individual “acting de facto as a superior.” 255 Furthermore, the court paid no attention to whether the conflict
was internal or international, and thus ignored whether the accused was a
state actor.256 Although neither of these tribunals took aim at the crime of
aggression, they are important for demonstrating that historically, international criminal law has not discriminated based on state affiliation.
Moving the focus to the 2010 amendment’s definition, while some
might point to the U.N.’s definition of aggression 257 as support for the
state focused approach, this argument is unconvincing. To begin with,
the U.N. definition passed into law in 1974, 258 pre-dating the Rome Statute by twenty-four years. When the U.N. definition and the new definition are held side-by-side, they are nearly identical. 259 In fact, Section
two, Article eight of the SWG’s discussion paper cites directly to U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 3314. 260 Yet, it is worth noting that the
assembled states that initially enacted the original Rome Statute did not
utilize the U.N. definition. When the Rome Statute was being drafted, the
Resolution 3314 definition was considered by some as a mere political
guide, unsuitable for prosecution purposes. 261
Furthermore, Resolution 3314 was passed in an era when newly
formed states were worried about the abuses of colonialism. 262 These
nations were concerned with interference by the major world powers that
took place during the Cold War. 263 Since the passing of U.N. Resolution
254. See Zegveld, supra note 156, at 154.
255. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, ¶ 76.
256. See Zegveld, supra note 156, at 154–55.
257. This definition, adopted in 1974, defines aggression as “the use of armed force by
a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set
out in this Definition.” G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX), supra note 187, art. 1.
258. G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX), supra note 187.
259. Compare G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), with Rome Statute Amendments, supra note
17, art 8(2).
260. “Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance
with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974,
qualify as an act of aggression.” ICC Discussion Paper, supra note 182, art. 8 bis(2).
261. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: MAJOR UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE DRAFT STATUTE 13 (1996), available at http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/2PrepCmtEstablishICCLCHR.pdf.
262. Specifically, the resolution was passed in 1974, during the Cold War. During this
time, many states found themselves threatened by the pressures of Soviet and U.S. influence. See Murphy, supra note 196, at 5.
263. Id.

680

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 36:2

3314, the U.N. itself has been critical of the inadequacies of the laws governing NSAs. In a General Assembly meeting of the U.N., it was admitted that when they were founded in 1945, the major concern was to prevent the outbreak of another World War. 264 Now, however, the HighLevel Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change has recognized that in
the decades to come, the threats facing the world go beyond “states waging aggressive war,” and include dangers like internal wars, terrorism,
and transnational criminal organizations. 265 Furthermore, these threats
stem from both NSAs as well as states. 266 When the U.N. has implicitly
acknowledged the weaknesses of their definition of aggression, it is nonsensical for the ASP to turn around and adopt identical language as its
own. Rather than ensuring the norms governing NSAs in the conflict
context remain up to par with states, the ASP chose to maintain an inadequate status quo.
IV. IMPROPER DEFINITION: AN OPPORTUNITY MISSED
By enacting the 2010 amendment to the Rome Statute, the international community has missed a critical opportunity to improve the laws policing NSAs. In 1974, the U.N. proffered several reasons for why it was
exigent to define aggression: 1) deterrence of aggression, 2) simplifying
identification of the crime, 3) simplifying measures for suppressing aggression, and 4) facilitating the protection of the rights and lawful interests of victims. 267 The proliferation of NSAs and the threat they pose to
collective security make these reasons just as, if not more, relevant today.
Part A of this Section criticizes the ASP for embracing an outdated definition of criminal aggression, virtually mimicking the one adopted by
the U.N. in 1974, while completely ignoring the shifting dynamic of international conflicts. This Section further points out that this is problematic because opportunities to update international law do not come frequently. Part B focuses on why the amendment’s definition is inferior to
other potential definitions that better align themselves with the norms of
international criminal law. Finally, Part C points out that excluding
NSAs from this definition undermines both the goals of the U.N. and of
criminalizing aggression.

264. At the initial creation of the U.N., the founding members considered collective
security in the traditional sense. That is, aggression against one would provoke a unified
response against the perpetrator. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, synopsis.
265. Id. (urging that “[t]he central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a
new and broader understanding . . . of what collective security means . . .”).
266. Id.
267. G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX), supra note 187.

2011]

DEFINING AGGRESSION FOR NON-STATE ACTORS

681

A. As the World Turns . . .
In a world where the boundaries of statehood continually evaporate,
both in business and conflicts, the amendment’s definition seems to
completely ignore international trends. Confining the crime of aggression
to conflicts between states commits the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime
to the same shortcomings that already plague international law. The failings of international humanitarian laws have often been pinpointed to
their being highly state-centric, despite the evolving non-state order. 268
Furthermore, in 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense’s National Defense Strategy described an environment “defined by a global struggle
against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state system.” 269 It makes little sense to focus the crime of aggression on states, when aggression seeking the explicit overthrow of statehood has become, at least from the U.S.’s purview, the world’s largest
problem.
Although the term NSA as used in this article admittedly encompasses
a broader array of groups than those discussed by the U.S. Department of
Defense, 270 those groups that were discussed offer an appropriate example. Much like the threats of Communism and Fascism which threatened
the global order in the past, the violent extremists of today not only reject
international law, but look to overthrow it. 271 These groups explicitly
reject ideas like borders and state sovereignty. 272 Conversely, without
principles like state sovereignty, the very notion of an international
community that comes together to create law is undermined.
This problem has existed for decades, and the only new development
about conflicts between a state and a NSA is the frequency with which
they occur. Napoleon’s campaigns in Spain during the 19th century,
German forces that occupied the Balkans during World War II, the conflict between Britain and Ireland, and the ongoing fighting between Israel
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories are all examples of such con-

268. Marco Sassòli, Engaging Armed Nonstate Actors with International Humanitarian Law, 6 CANADIAN CONSORTIUM ON HUMAN SECURITY, no. 2, 2008, at 15, available
at http://www.humansecurity.info/#/vol62-sassoli/4527407461.
269. U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY, supra note 122, at 2.
270. The Department of Defense report was largely concerned with reacting to the
proliferation of terrorist organizations, citing the 9/11 attacks in its introduction, and discussing violent extremist ideology that is not necessarily applicable to all NSAs. Although terrorist organizations fall within the purview of the term NSA, as the term is used
in this Note it encompasses a broader range of groups. Id.
271. See id.
272. See id.
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flicts. 273 However, those are examples spread across hundreds of years.
Today, one need only pick up a newspaper to see several such conflicts
around the globe. 274 Just nine days after the Bali Bombing 275 on October
12, 2002, fourteen people were killed in a suicide bombing in Israel. 276
Meanwhile, Mounir El Motassadeq, a suspected member of Al-Qaida
operating in Hamburg, was standing trial in Germany as an accomplice
to the 9/11 attacks. 277 As the number of incidents involving NSAs increases, so does the frequency with which the legal system must deal
with them. Yet the2010 amendment’s definition neither attempts to predict future problems, nor does it react to emerging ones; instead, ASP
chose to react to problems that faced the U.N. thirty-five years ago.
Further recognition of the threat presented by NSAs can be gleaned
from developments in the laws of war. According to the Yugoslavia tribunal, the laws of armed conflict have shifted from protecting state sovereignty to protecting human rights.278 The African Union signed the NonAggression Common Defense Pact, defining aggression as the use of
armed force by a state, an organization of states, or non-state actors. 279

273. Anthony Rogers, Asymmetric Warfare: Some Personal Reflections, 27
COLLEGIUM (SPECIAL ISSUE) 15, 15 (2003).
274. Id. at 16.
275. The bombing took place at a bar in the town of Kuta, killing 202 people and injuring 209. The group thought to be responsible was Jemaah Islamiyah, an Islamist group
linked to Al-Qaida. Other Indonesian officials believe that Al-Qaida was directly responsible.
2002
Bali
Terrorist
Bombings,
KNOWLEDGERUSH,
http://www.knowledgerush.com/kr/encyclopedia/2002_Bali_terrorist_bombing/
(last
visited Jan. 15, 2011).
276. On October 21, 2002, fourteen people were killed as the result of a suicide bombing. The attack was carried out by an explosive-laden Jeep. Terrorism Against Israel in
2002,
KNOWLEDGERUSH,
http://www.knowledgerush.com/kr/encyclopedia/Terrorism_against_Israel_in_2002/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2011).
277. Mounir El Motassadeq was initially charged on August 29, 2002, and was convicted for complicity in the 9/11 attacks on February 18, 2003. Profile: Mounir El MotasCOMMONS,
sadeq,
HISTORY
http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=mounir_el_motassadeq (last visited
Jan. 15, 2011).
278. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 154, at 258.
279. African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, Afr. Union, Jan. 31,
2005, 4th Ord. Sess. (not yet entered into force), available at http://www.africaunion.org/root/AU/Documents/Treaties/text/Non%20Aggression%20Common%20Defence
%20Pact.pdf. The tragedies in Africa make it a marquee example of the implications of
the crime of aggression, as there have been over nine million internally displaced people,
and hundreds of thousands of deaths resulting from a variety of conflicts and civil wars.
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Additionally, countries like France have restructured their armies to be
better suited for asymmetric warfare, 280 rather than traditional warfare
where the assembled forces of two or more states confront each other. 281
Thus, as the landscape of war continues to change, it is important that the
rules governing warfare do likewise.
Discussions by the U.N. also support including NSAs under the definition of aggression. It is worth noting that since adopting Resolution
3314, the U.N. Security Council has specifically condemned a NSA for
committing the crime of aggression. Security Council Resolution 405
condemned the mercenary group 282 which attacked Benin on January 17,
1977, for “the act of armed aggression.” 283 This resolution makes no reference to a state sponsor. 284 The International Law Commission viewed
the coup in the Comoros Islands in a similar vein. 285 The coup was conducted by mercenaries not affiliated with any state, causing the commission to fear they would not be guilty of aggression under a state-centered
definition. 286 Additionally, the U.N. recognized that the norms governing
the use of force by NSAs have not kept up with their state-centered equivalents. 287 This report, compiled by the Chair of the High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change called on the U.N. to “achieve the same
degree of normative strength concerning non-state use of force as it has
concerning state use of force.” 288 The ASP to the Rome Statute should
build upon this emerging awareness rather than ignore it.

Anup Shah, Conflicts in Africa, GLOBAL ISSUES (Aug. 21, 2010),
http://www.globalissues.org/issue/83/conflicts-in-africa.
280. Asymmetric warfare typically refers to situations where well-trained regular
troops are pit against poorly trained irregular troops. Rogers, supra note 273, at 15.
281. Id. at 16.
282. A group of roughly 100 persons, partly comprised of twenty-seven Africans and
sixty-two European mercenaries, conducted a poorly organized assault on Cotonou. They
departed via private jet three hours after conducting a small arms assault of the presidential palace. History—Benin—Growth, Future, Power, Sector, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIONS,
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Benin-HISTORY.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2011).
283. S.C. Res 405, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/405 (Apr. 14, 1977); see also Keith A. Petty,
Sixty Years in the Making: The Definition of Aggression for the International Criminal
Court, 31 HASTINGS INT’L AND COMP. L. REV. 16 (2008).
284. S.C. Res 405, supra note 283, ¶ 2.
285. See Rosemary Rayfuse, The Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind: Eating Disorders at the International Law Commission, 8 CRIM. L.F. 43, 59
(1997).
286. See id.
287. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶ 159.
288. Id.
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It was a mistake to allow an opportunity to address these issues pass
because it is not often that the laws governing conflicts see meaningful
change. 289 Given the complexity of the issues involved and the countless
interests represented, 290 enacting an international treaty takes a long time.
This is evident from the four year gap between the establishment and
entering into force of the Rome Statute,291 as well as the seven year gap
between the court’s creation and the first review. 292 Furthermore, it was
not until twenty-nine years after the passage of the U.N. Charter that a
definition to aggression was added.293 Thirty years later, the norms governing NSAs in a conflict context are still criticized by the U.N. 294 As
such, since the ASP to the Rome Statute adopted a definition of aggression without addressing NSAs, it may be years, if not decades, before
another opportunity presents itself. As a result, the international community is committed to dealing with NSAs who engage in unlawful force,
without adequate dispute resolution mechanisms.
B. Individuals? No. Criminal Organizations? No.
The accepted definition of aggression represents a missed opportunity
for the international community for two reasons. The definition restricts
prosecution to individuals who “exercise control over or [] direct the political or military action of a state.” 295 Thus, the ICC will have no jurisdiction over NSAs, regardless of their capacity, 296 and as such, will not
be able to levy any sort of judgment against the organization with which
a suspected criminal is involved. To fully appreciate the shortcomings of

289. The Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1949. Twenty-eight years passed before the two Additional Protocols were adopted. Since 1977, no new additions have been
made to that branch of law. Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 30. See
also Henckaerts, Binding Armed Opposition Groups, supra note 39, at 128 (pointing out
that as far as international humanitarian law is concerned, formalizing it into treatises is
all but over).
290. The U.N. Database of documents associated with defining the crime of aggression
for the ICC includes over a dozen different definitions for the crime, including proposals
from: Greece, Portugal, Germany, Egypt, Cuba, and the Russian Federation. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Documents on the Crime of Aggression, UNITED
NATIONS
(Sept.
9,
2003),
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/documents/aggression/aggressiondocs.htm.
291. Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 35.
292. Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 123.
293. See G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX), supra note 187.
294. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶ 159.
295. Rome Statute Amendments, supra note 17, art 8(1).
296. See id.
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this definition, it is important to consider the implications of an alternate
definition.
In this regard, the accepted definition of aggression steps away from
the foundations of international criminal law, rather than looking to them
as a guideline. The Nuremberg IMT not only took aim at the crime of
aggression, but defined it in a manner substantially different than the
ASP. 297 For starters, the statute took aim specifically at individuals and
further explained that an individual’s position will not factor into the
question of guilt. 298 Moreover, although the statute was meant to prosecute war criminals in the aftermath of World War II, 299 the statute actually took aim specifically at NSAs. Where the IMT found an individual
was associated with an illegal group or organization, it empowered the
IMT to declare that they were criminal organizations. 300 This in turn allowed the state harboring such organizations to treat any known affiliates
as criminals and prosecute them accordingly. 301 In such further prosecutions, the criminal nature of the organization was not considered and the
IMT’s decision was taken as final. 302
It is clear that this statute meant to take aim at individuals and the
groups they were associated with, irrelevant of state affiliation. In a
modern context, if a definition similar to the one utilized by the Nuremberg IMT replaced the 2010 amendment, it would vastly improve the
ICC’s power over NSAs. Not only would the court be allowed to hear the
cases of individuals brought before them, but a successful prosecution
would trigger state jurisdiction over criminals that happen to be part of
the same organization. Theoretically, if the Nuremberg IMT’s definition
applied, the ICC could prosecute a member of Al-Qaida who was involved in the 9/11 attack, irrelevant of his status as a policy-maker. Furthermore, if the prosecution was successful, it would trigger criminal
status in every nation that Al-Qaida is located. Given that Al-Qaida has
known affiliations in the Philippines, Eritrea, Algeria, Afghanistan,
Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kashmir, Somalia, and Yemen, this would be a

297. Nuremberg IMT, supra note 72, art. 6(a); cf ICC Discussion Paper, supra note
182.
298. Although the fact that a person was only acting under orders might be considered
as a mitigating factor, it had no bearing on actual guilt. See Nuremberg IMT, supra note
72, arts. 6,7.
299. See Heller, supra note 222, at 480.
300. Nuremberg IMT, supra note 72, art. 9.
301. Id. art. 10.
302. Although the group/organization would be allowed to bring an appeal to the IMT
questioning its criminality, until such an appeal was won, the issue was sealed. See id.
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major accomplishment. 303 In addition to being responsible to the ICC,
national courts in those nations would have jurisdiction over Al-Qaida
members, and the question of the group’s criminal nature would be predecided. Conversely, under the new definition, if the ICC managed to get
a hold of the person directly responsible for the 9/11 attacks, they would
not be able to prosecute him, let alone his underlings or foreign associates.
C. Undermining its Own Goals
It is important to remember that changes to the Rome Statute not only
affect the ICC, but also have implications for the U.N. Both the U.N. and
the ICC have recognized the goal of reaching a “mutually beneficial relationship,” formalized in an agreement between both parties. 304 The
agreement dictated that the two entities should cooperate closely in furtherance of performing their respective responsibilities. 305 This relationship is evidenced by the Security Council’s right to refer cases to the
ICC 306 and the U.N.’s obligation to provide the ICC with documents relevant to a given case. 307 Implicit to such a symbiotic relationship is that
fulfillment of the goals of one party benefits the other. While updating
the norms that govern the use of force by NSAs is a U.N. interest, 308 it is
a goal that the ASP to the Rome Statute had an opportunity to accomplish. Furthermore, the effects of this relationship have already been recognized. The report from the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change points out that early indications showed that the Security
Council’s willingness to use its power under the Rome Statute might deter parties from violating laws of war. 309 The report argued that the
U.N.’s role in preventing wars would be improved by developing the
legal regimes and dispute resolution mechanisms. 310 Because of this, the

303. Hayes et al., supra note 9 (highlighting the complexity of Al-Qaida’s infrastructure).
304. Negotiated Relationship Agreement, supra note 68.
305. Id. art. 3.
306. Rome Statute, supra note 51, art. 13(b) (listing “a situation in which one or more
of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council . . .” as one way in which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction).
307. The U.N. commits itself “to cooperate with the Court and to provide the Court
such information or documents as the Court may request pursuant to article 87, paragraph
6, of the Statute.” Negotiated Relationship Agreement, supra note 68, art. 15.
308. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶ 159.
309. See id. ¶ 90.
310. See id. ¶ 89.
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Rome Statute is one of the most important recent developments in terms
of legal mechanisms. 311
With the ramifications on the U.N. and global community in mind, a
definition of aggression that excludes NSAs undermines the purpose of
criminalizing the act. This is particularly troubling because states and
NSAs are equally capable of the threats a definition of aggression seeks
to avert. Surely, where the goals of the U.N. were to deter, identify, and
suppress aggression, 312 the source of the aggression should be irrelevant.
A NSA that has the capabilities of using force on the global scale can just
as easily threaten peace and national security as a state entity. 313
Even in purely internal conflicts, aggression by NSAs can undermine a
state government, with the resultant instability creating a threat to international peace and security. 314 An armed attack carried out by a NSA is
still an armed attack, and the threat presented to a nation’s security is in
no way lessened because it stems from an entity not recognized by international law. 315 For example, in 1974, under Resolution 3314, the U.N.
highlighted the existence of weapons of mass destruction as a reason for
why defining aggression was so important.316 Incidentally, a report to the
U.N. General Assembly thirty years later highlighted that amongst the
challenges facing collective security was the possibility of NSAs obtaining nuclear or biological weapons. 317 Given the gravity of the crime of
aggression, ignoring NSAs’ very real capabilities of carrying out criminal aggression is simply inconsistent with the goals of the U.N. and the
ASP to the Rome Statute.
Similarly, if by defining aggression the goal is to protect victims’
rights and access to remedies, 318 the state-centered approach is again,
counterintuitive. The 1974 resolution reaffirmed a duty that states not use
armed force to deprive people of their rights and freedoms or disrupt the
territorial integrity of a victim state. 319 Yet, the High-Level Panel on
311. See id. ¶ 90.
312. See G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX), supra note 187.
313. See Printer, supra note 194, at 348 (highlighting the damage that a NSA such as a
terrorist organization is capable of causing).
314. See Rayfuse, supra note 285, at 59–60.
315. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 204 (4th ed. 2005)
(discussing that to qualify as an armed attack under the U.N. Charter, an attack must be
carried out against a state, not necessarily by a state); see also Printer, supra note 194, at
348.
316. G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX), supra note 187.
317. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶ 112 (discussing specifically, the
danger of a terrorist organization acquiring weapons of mass destruction).
318. See G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX), supra note 187.
319. Id.
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Threats, Challenges, and Change reports that the ideals behind terrorism
are an attack on the U.N.’s respect for human rights. 320 Additionally, the
report cites the rise of civil wars as the predominant form of warfare as
evidence that new states 321 face crises of capacity and legitimacy. 322 Recognizing these facts evidences that NSAs are capable of causing the
very problem a definition of aggression hopes to avert. Thus, given the
victim oriented nature of this goal, it is irrational to think the victim
would be concerned with whether the person violating his rights had
state association. It is hard to rectify affording a villager in some Bosnian
valley certain protections from having his rights violated by a foreign
aggressor, but denying them to civilians living in a valley plagued by
internal conflict. 323
Considering that NSAs fall outside the scope of the U.N. Charter, 324 it
is even more imperative to hold them criminally responsible under international law. As discussed above, the idea of international criminal law
is to punish crimes that pierce state value-neutrality. 325 It logically follows that if the U.N.’s purpose is to maintain peace and promote national
security, then groups bent on undermining those principles should be the
focus, not the exception. 326 Yet, for example, Al-Qaida is considered the
first instance of a sophisticated terrorist network, 327 and has publicly
stated that the U.N. is one of its enemies and stands as an obstacle to its
goals. 328 Such declarations are not hollow rhetoric as Al-Qaida was responsible for attacks against ten members of the U.N. across four continents between 1999 and 2004. 329 Ignoring such groups is an acquiescence of a threat to international stability, something that the U.N. hopes
to avoid, 330 and is an interest of the ASP to the Rome Statute in defining

320. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶ 145.
321. The Panel uses the term “new states” to refer to states that emerged in the second
half of the U.N.’s existence. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
322. Id.
323. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 154, at 68 (arguing that common civilians, who are
likely going to be the victims of criminal aggression, should be afforded the same rights
irrelevant of who their assailant is).
324. The U.N. Charter was enacted by, and governs the states party to it. By definition,
NSAs are excluded. See supra Part II.
325. See Mégret, supra note 16, at 2.
326. See Printer, supra note 194, at 350.
327. High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶ 146.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See Printer, supra note 194, at 350 (arguing that if a NSA is going to seek to use
force on a global scale, maintaining global peace and security demand that the U.N.’s
policies govern that group’s actions).
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aggression. 331 Given the “piercing state value-neutrality” principle for
defining an activity as an international crime, if the ASP to the Rome
Statute finds that endangering one of the founding principles of the U.N.
does not constitute such a crime, it is difficult to imagine what does.
In updating the laws governing the use of force, the goal should be
creating parity between states and NSAs. 332 Instead, holding NSAs outside the scope of criminal aggression presents a problem of symmetry.
There is no question that once a state has been attacked by a NSA such
as a terrorist, that state will be bound by the U.N. Charter. 333 Specifically, Article 51 of the Charter allows the use of force in self-defense if an
armed attack occurs.334 Since a state could target a NSA under this article
as it does not limit the targets of lawful self-defense, 335 this would mean
one party to the conflict has to conduct hostilities within the scope of a
set of laws, while the other does not. This double standard does not make
sense; the U.N. should work towards establishing normative rules concerning the use of force by NSAs that match state equivalents. 336 Just as
there is no question that the U.S. was bound by Article 51 of the Charter
following 9/11, 337 it is agreed that the attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda
were of severe enough quality to constitute an armed attack, triggering
retaliation under Article 51. 338 The new definition formally recognizes
that in the ensuing conflict between the U.S. and Al-Qaida, one party
was bound by all relevant laws of the U.N. Charter, whereas the other
remains an anomaly in international jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
Regulating criminal activity and ensuring collective security is one of
the chief goals of the international community. Yet, it is a problem that
grows more complex with the proliferation of NSAs and is compounded
by the fact that laws governing these groups are an anachronism of international law. Branches of law such as international humanitarian and
human rights law are a holdover from a time when the most pressing
concern of the international community was the outbreak of another
331. Drumbl, supra note 231, at 14 (claiming the four interests involved in defining
aggression are stability, security, human rights, and sovereignty).
332. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶ 161.
333. See Printer, supra note 194, at 351 (pointing out that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter does not limit the targets of lawful self defense).
334. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
335. See id.; see also Printer, supra note 194, at 351.
336. See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, ¶ 159.
337. Printer, supra note 194, at 353.
338. Id.
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world war and, as such, focus entirely on the state. 339 The U.N. itself was
created under the daunting shadow of World War II and was essentially a
direct response to the catastrophic event.340 Thus, it is not surprising that
many of the principles formalized by its charter completely ignore the
threats created by NSAs.
Going forward, it is important to recognize the weaknesses of the
present legal framework so that future laws do not succumb to the same
problems. Of the three principle branches of international law associated
with armed conflicts, two arguably do not apply to NSAs. International
human rights law is recognized as only incurring state responsibility 341
and NSAs can properly contest international humanitarian law as inapplicable because they had no part in its enactment. 342 International criminal law alone has managed to pierce state borders by targeting individuals rather than abstract, collective entities. 343
Given an international climate where some of the most pressing dangers stem from terrorism and transnational criminal organizations, it is
important to preserve international criminal law’s role in prosecuting
NSAs. In the realm of international criminal law, there is no more important establishment than the ICC. The ICC is the first and only permanent
international court that is the functional equivalent of the transient IMTs
of the past. 344 The Rome Statute, which empowers and confers jurisdiction to the ICC, explicitly targets NSAs as capable of committing three
of the four recognized crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. 345 The fourth crime, aggression, was undefined until 2010.
The definition of aggression agreed on by the ASP to the Rome Statute
is nonsensical on numerous levels, the most basic of which is that it contradicts the principles of international criminal law. Starting with the
IMTs following World War II through those established to prosecute the
atrocities in Yugoslavia, international criminal law has focused on the
individual, irrelevant of state association. The amendment definition
makes aggression the lone crime for which the ICC cannot prosecute
NSAs.
Moreover, in adopting a criminal definition of aggression, the ASP to
the Rome Statute apparently ignored the problems afflicting the present
and future in favor of combatting the issues of the past. The goals of de339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

See High-Level Panel Report, supra note 19, synopsis.
See id.
See supra Part II.B.
See id.
See TORTURE BY NON-STATE ACTORS, supra note 168.
Humanitarian Negotiations Manual, supra note 23, at 35.
See Rome Statute, supra note 51, arts. 5(1), 25(2).
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fining aggression are to police the unlawful use of armed force, preserve
collective security, and provide relief for victims of unlawful aggression. 346 Yet when considering these reasons, it is patently clear that a
NSA is just as much a threat as a state actor. The growth of organizations
such as Al-Qaida clearly demonstrates that in the modern era, NSAs are
capable of disrupting international security in the same manner as states.
Furthermore, it is clear that any victim-based reasons should see no distinction in state-affiliation. If a group of villagers lose their home or
loved ones as a result of the unlawful use of force, the legal affiliation of
those who caused their loss is likely a distant afterthought.
Thus, when the ASP to the Rome Statute gathered in 2010 it had a
unique opportunity to update international law. A proper definition of
aggression would have improved the legal mechanisms for policing
NSAs for their international crimes. It could also have helped eliminate
the disparities between the laws of armed conflict as they apply to states
and NSAs. Instead, these opportunities were missed and there is no telling when there will be another such chance.
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